INTRODUCTION

The present paper seeks to answer the question: what is the science of politics or political science? This is the question of a metascientific nature. To answer it exhaustively would require a vast study. In an essay, we cannot avoid simplifications. However, I choose to accept them for at least two reasons. Firstly, because in the Polish political science literature there are extremely few metatheoretical studies. Secondly, because I came to the conclusion that this state of research should be compared with its counterpart in the English-language literature. Given the fact that the size of the latter is truly impressive, I found it a mitigating circumstance to the extent that it will absolve me from both the charge of not having studied it exhaustively enough and from the sketchy form of my presentation.

The question posed here concerns applied science or the science whose purpose is to serve man through the methodical interpretation and rational explanation of what he/she experiences in the political reality and to help him/her understand his/her participation in the collective form of life, which is politics, and thereby facilitate opening to the world and communication with others. The
problem lies, however, in that politics is a highly complex and pluralistic sphere of human activity. Scientific reflection on it, therefore, must necessarily be also diversified. The more so that science itself is an ambiguous concept, understood and practiced in diverse ways, and governed by various conventions in the form of methodological rules. Specialists in general scientific methodology claim – and they have to be trusted in this – that there are no non-historical or universal criteria of scientificity. Therefore, by definition, there cannot be only one answer to our simple question. Nevertheless, for all these different, currently existing and prospectively possible answers, I can find a certain broad (in terms of description and explanation), collective category in the form of the metaphor of a discursive platform, which gives a special unity (synthesis) to the theoretical approaches and research disciplines that meet on it. The latter, which are essentially subdisciplines of political science, are sometimes called science(s) of politics or political science. The concept of discursive platform will allow me to give up the plural number to subsume all these subdisciplines under one science – a field of scientific writing, united by certain functional, linguistic (especially semantically) and epistemological/general-philosophical elements. While these ties are not too strong, they are effective enough to allow us in practice to justifiably apply the joint name of science of politics or political science.

The present paper is divided into three parts. Part One shows the institutional determinants of political science, which influence the way of understanding and pursuing it both in Poland and in the United States. Part Two reminds us of the double rationality of this discipline, combining theoretical and practical, descriptive and normative, and social and humanistic studies. Finally, Part Three presents strictly methodological reflections, focused on showing and explaining mechanisms that take part in the unification of political science in the form and on a scale of the platform.

**SCIENCE IN THE FETTERS OF INSTITUTIONS**

Political science is an academic discipline in an identity crisis. This is the case both in Poland and in the Western world: Europe and the USA. There are different reasons for this state of affairs at home and abroad: they partly overlap, and partly they have their local specific character both here and there.

One of the leading Polish political scientists, Czesław Mojsiewicz, in his 1996 report *Polityka w Polsce na etapie transformacji* (Political science in Poland at the stage of transformation), says that this discipline is a part of the humanities made up of sixteen ‘specialties’ (1). In the same report, its author, when discussing the condition of scholarly studies conducted in this field in Poland, stresses new dangers they are facing today – new ones at the stage of transformation of the political system, and therefore with no ideological and political constraints, which were the determinant of science in Poland in the cold war era. Characteristically enough, Mojsiewicz sees these dangers from the standpoint of the functioning of the state institution that decides who deserves (and who does not) to be awarded the postdoctoral degree (habilitated doctor) or the title of professor in political science. Revealing the criteria used for this purpose by the Central Qualifying Commission for Degrees and Titles (2), he names as the first of these dangers „the blurring of boundaries between scientific disciplines related to political science, mainly political history, the science of state and law, and sociology versus political science” (3). This type of ascertainment, understandable form the standpoint of a decision-making institution in the sphere of science, which, by nature, is governed by the need to maximize formalization of knowledge, is surprising from the methodological point of view. How should we understand it then? Are the sciences ‘closely’ related to political science, called ‘specialties’ earlier in the text, each taken separately, something different from political science itself? What would it be without them then? If, however, they are its constituents, how is it possible that they can, let us say this, ‘deconstruct’ it, deprive it of distinctive features. Perhaps the concept itself of ‘science of politics/political science’ was clandestinely treated as hypostasis, i.e. some ideal construction, independent of research practice? There are more and more doubts about it. One things seems certain, though: the rationality
of the decision-making institution concerning political science clashes with the rationality of scientific cognition employed (also) in politics.

In other words, the Central Commission’s criteria are irrational from the methodological point of view, according to which science cannot essentially be controlled because originally it denotes the process of creative cognition (4). The criteria are (can be) rational from the standpoint of theory or sociology of science, which apply the term science to the whole field of culture consisting of all the *objective results of cognition* in the form of methods, theories, institutions, etc. This is a perspective on the practice of pursuing science and the social, organizational, or financial (etc.) mechanisms governing it. In practice, the ‘rationality’ of political science as an academic discipline is determined institutionally in Poland. It consists in the conformance with the *interests and views* of a group of people who perform the role of gatekeepers, who decide directly or indirectly about filling the professorial posts at the political science faculties at universities and colleges. The *practical* answer to the question ‘what is political science’ corresponds from their perspective with Paul K. Feyerabend’s description: „science is what I do, what my colleagues do, and what the likes of us together with the majority of society regard as ‘scientific’ ” (5).

And Czesław Mojsiewicz answers the question: who is a political scientist?, formulating the following three criteria: 1) self-identification with political science, by which he understands a political science teaching-research institution (faculty, institute, department/chair at a university or college), 2) completion of a political science degree program or a related one (law), and a doctoral or postdoctoral degree, 3) scholarly achievements that are the grounds for awarding professorship in „humanities on the basis of achievements in political science” (6). This is a classic tautological definition in the institutional version: all the three criteria are purely formal in the institutional sense. In short, a political scientist/political science is one who/which has a set of properties that allow him/it to seek this appellation, conferred upon him/it by persons acting in the name of a particular social institution functioning (in a given country, place, and time) with the status and under the aegis of political science.

As I said at the beginning, this situation of political science is by no means only a Polish *specificum*. It also looks the same in other countries, including the oldest democracy or the United States, where, naturally, the analogous function of gatekeepers is not exercised by any federal/state commission. This status is held however by the leading organization called the American Political Science Association. It publishes the *American Political Science Review* (number one out of 79 periodicals in this field according to the criterion of being cited as announced by the *Journal Citation Report* for 2004), which, alongside the *American Journal of Political Science* (which in turn advertises as the most widely-read political science journal in the USA) is regarded as the most important periodical in this domain. In *practice* the two periodicals determine the criteria of scientificity of political science studies in the USA and they are believed to have a *de facto* decisive impact on the employment policy at US *political science departments*. They do so in an arbitrary way, promoting first of all positivist methods in research, which are essentially oriented towards generalization and statistics. Figures show for example that in the AIPS 86% of papers in 1975–1979 were written with a behaviorist approach or used the perspective of rational choice theory, in 1997–2001 the respective coefficient being 71%, while in the APSR the percentage of positivist papers during the same periods was 76 and 63%.

The domination and privileged status of positivism, especially behaviorism and the rational choice theory, in American political science (including international relations; the same phenomenon being also observable to a lesser extent in the UK) are criticized by many. Some of them do not so much challenge the importance of positivist studies as they mildly point out the need to accept epistemological pluralism in social sciences. They remind us that not all social relations can be directly observed and presented in figures, that empirical ‘results’ can be interpreted in many ways, depending on the theoretical assumptions adopted by a research scholar (7). Other critics of this state of affairs point out the paradoxes accompanying it. Ido Oren, when writing a history of American political science in his book *Our Enemies and US: America’s Rivalries and Making of Political Science* (2003), exposes its ideological leanings entangled in scientific rhetoric. Now
American political science, making the picture of itself, insists that it is an ‘objective science independent of its national origin and historical context’ and at the same time a science committed to ‘freedom and democracy’. This involvement, Oren believes, undermines its objectivity, which he demonstrates especially by the example of modifications, which political science made in the content of the definition of democracy. At each stage of its history since the World War II, it emphasized similarities between the US and its allies, the similarities that are expected to distinguish it from the competitors of America. It turns out, however, that they are employed instrumentally, serving to legitimate US foreign policy, providing it with the key concept of ‘democratic’ peace (8), which in reality denotes the international order based on the terms imposed by the US. Sometimes it is directly called pax Americana. Another paradox in the history of American political science is seen in connection with the thought of Isaiah Berlin, also important for itself. In his main 1962 essay with the characteristic title question Does Political Theory Still Exist? Berlin maintains that political theory will never become science because of the nature of questions it asks. Among others, he meant normative questions, which, he says, remain ‘obstinately philosophical’ while, he believes, what is „characteristic of specifically philosophical questions is that they do not ... satisfy conditions required by an independent science, the principal among which is that the path to their solution must be implicit in their very formulation”. This refers to the conditions set forth in the positivist methodology of studies, satisfied both by formal and empirical sciences but, as Berlin holds, not satisfied by political theories. Forty years later, American scholar Ruth W. Grant finds that in the past period political theory developed much faster in the USA at political science departments, where 81% professional political theorists are employed today, than at departments of philosophy (9).

Let us return to the situation in Poland. It resembles the American situation in that Polish representatives of social sciences also exhibit positivist preferences. The essential difference appears to be that these preferences in Poland are generally of Marxist provenance. Therefore, this is, as it were, second-hand positivism, inherited from the scientistic Marxist scenery. It still shows its vitality today: from the dissemination of bizarre if methodologically naive maxims, like for example the one about the scholarly text, which must not be written in the first person, to the ultra-optimistic belief that political science is following only one path to scientificity, defined by the dialectical triad: from the stage of epistemological eclecticism (the rise of the discipline in the pre-theoretic stage: intuitive association of phenomena) to the stage of epistemological heterogenism (integration of individual sciences around one discipline, which is the science of politics) to epistemological autogenism: political science becomes a theoretical, autonomous discipline, integrated on the basis of uniform and specific assumptions. When this idea dawned on Polish political scientists in 1982 (historically this was the start of martial law in Poland), they then answered consistently that those assumptions, certainly, could be satisfied by „first of all, the philosophy of historical materialism, which was a general conception of society as a whole” (10). This pattern of the discipline’s development, attractive in its simplicity and based on the conviction that analytical-empirical methods of natural sciences can and should be applied in social sciences, outlived its era. It can be found intact as late as in 1998 in one of the best studies in Polish on the problems of political decision making. Having referred to it, the explanation follows that „as a result of such an evolution, biochemistry arose, for example” (11), then the reader becomes immersed in excellent reading based almost entirely on ... the American (positivist) literature on the subject!

The spirit of Marxism is therefore still taking revenge even, as we see, in this unthinking and apparently innocent (theatrical) way, on Polish humanities tormented by ideology, trying to arouse in us irrational fears of ‘metaphysics’, dooming to infamy all qualitative studies – studies of the subjective aspect of social reality. All these in order to promote ‘dialectics’ – only one analytical-empirical model of science, the only one worthy of this name. (Empirical studies were traditionally commissioned and funded in Poland by the institutions of the communist state. The academic circles even today have retained the attitude of submission to the authorities – the successively changing political parties at the helm of the state. This subjective remark can be made ‘scientific’
and treated favorably as the effect of the participating observation technique employed by its author). In this way, the aforementioned ‘spirit’ also slows down the free development of political science, causing it to try to institutionally ensure imaginary epistemological purity for itself, which is also demanded by Czesław Mojsiewicz (referred to above). I am afraid, however, that these are futile efforts, doomed, as we shall see, to face unrelenting resistance both on the part of the character of political science itself and its area of subject matter: extremely complex, requiring different research perspectives and diverse conceptions of science associated with them. Both these elements together make theoreti-co-scientific reflection on political science a difficult and unrewarding occupation. This is evidenced, for example, by comprehensive, usually joint studies compiled in Poland, under the heading ‘Introduction to the science of state and politics’ or ‘Fundamentals of political science’. They lack any general metatheoretical reflection that would show at least some pretense of integration of political science (12).

The question about the condition and identity of contemporary political science inspires, however, systematic reflection initiated with an almost regular frequency in the English-speaking countries. The collective self-reflection of political science takes place there more or less every decade under the auspices of the already mentioned American Political Science Association (13), the organization founded in 1903, currently with over fifteen thousand members from eighty countries. For understandable historical reasons, Poland obviously does not have such traditions (14).

The Anglo-American example confirms my belief that the aforementioned difficulty and unrewarding nature of meta-political science reflection does not mean that it is impossible. Employing the Anglo-American assistance, therefore, I shall seek to demonstrate this below, in my own way, fully aware of all my limitations, which should probably also include my philosophical education. I hope at this point that the presented theoreti-co-scientific argumentation will be able to neutralize not only post-Marxist prejudices and misconceptions among political scientists, but also the (far more serious) fear of the loss of identity of their discipline. Ultimately, the point is that they should accept its specificity.

**DOUBLE RATIONALITY**

The science of politics is determined on two sides: both by its subject and object. This double determination translates into tension that arises between reason and reality, i.e. between our notions or images of ideal life and social organization, and the realities, the practice of social life with its limitations and constraints. The task of science, traditionally understood as the domain of ideal concepts, is to legitimate practice (some, as we will see, have serious doubts about this), which denotes here concrete political orders. The main problem with the accomplishment of this task in modern times lies, it appears, in keeping a balance between the two sides: between facticity and validity. Overconfidence in empirical studies is harmful to practical science just as is too much trust in intellectual constructs that connote ideal legal and economic communities of free and equal citizens. One must admit that the latter arouse more concerns, also in the context of the problem of identity of political science. Intellectualization/rationalization is usually (ultimately) associated here with the destructive tendency towards metaphysical thinking. When, for example, Ian Shapiro, a Yale University political scientist, asks himself the question today: what’s wrong with political science and what to do about it?, he sees the reason for this state of affairs precisely in this tendency – our intellectual inclination to look for the foundations. He describes it as follows:

> It seems to be an endemic obsession of political scientists to believe that there must be general explanations of all political phenomena, indeed to subsume them into a single theoretical program. Theory-drivenness kicks in when the pursuit of generality comes at the expense of the pursuit of empirical validity. ‘Positive’ theorists sometimes assert that it is an appropriate division of labor for them to pursue generality while others worry about validity (15).
That controlling through theories, i.e. by rationality outside politics, which is harmful to knowledge about it (to understanding politics) has been known for a long time. Michael Oakeshott, reflecting in his 1947 text on the rationality of both politics itself and studies of it, comes to the conclusion that wrong is he who tries to reduce all knowledge of politics to techniques – to knowledge that can be formulated „in the form of rules, principles, instructions, or maxims i.e. in most general terms, in the form of propositions”. Politics reduced to engineering is, for the English scholar, „politics of the felt need”. Therefore, for politics, the model situation of political life is a condition of deficiency, or more exactly, a condition of morbidity: a series of crises that need repairing. This is why it creates demand for genuine ‘scholars’: economists, psychologists and other experts in particular selected problems, who, however, use one universal language of quantitative studies. Oakeshott says that this is a vision of politics of excellence and homogeneity, according to which only the best solutions are taken into account – it does not recognize accidental, local determinants, and there is no room for diversity in it. We should add that rationalism, in the sense given to it by Oakeshott, is the source of totalitarianism in politics. The problem is that any practical activity, in this writer’s view, assumes two kinds of knowledge: alongside technical knowledge, it additionally contains practical knowledge. And the latter, as we know from elsewhere, is not reflective, it cannot be constrained within some rules, it is an art acquired in practice, requiring involvement, imagination, and finally, courage. Without it, it is impossible not only to learn any skill but also to pursue „genuine scholarly activities”. Between political science and the other social sciences there is a quantitative rather than qualitative difference: Oakeshott believes that it is precisely political science in which the double character is vested to the extreme degree, associated with the combination of the two kinds of knowledge. We could express it like this: political science is a praxeological knowledge combining two components: scientific, i.e. technical knowledge, rational in the narrow sense, and humanistic, i.e. practical knowledge, adopting the broad sense of reason. The former gives us an illusion of certainty and self-sufficiency. The latter, however, seems imprecise, uncertain, „based only on belief and probability rather than truth”. It is the domain of the power of judgment, or, as Oakeshott says, it can be expressed by means of taste and connoisseurship (16).

Taste and connoisseurship were used by the author to define the form of reason that we use every day. Its (systematic and explanatory) extension is the science of politics – the field of social life, sometimes perceived, as we can see, even as the least suitable to be treated in a rationalist way. To pursue it thus requires not only scientific reason – instrumental, calculative, but also (according to some: essentially, strict proportions between the two types of reason cannot be established) practical reason, traditionally called taste, fronesis, prudence or power of judgment. Both these types of reason actually find their place in the etymology itself of the phrase theory of politics (or political theory), thus making it an oxymoron (and thereby confirming Oakeshott’s observation about the double nature of political science, double to the ‘highest degree’). Now, the Greek bios politikos, like the Latin vita activa denote the area of human affairs, changing and accidental by nature. The Greek theoria relates, on the other hand, to intellectual cognition, which expresses that which is eternal and unchanging, that which fills in Plato’s world of ideas. Theoretical cognition is the result of the mind’s ‘eye’, the contemplative viewing all by oneself of the abstract, universal order of things. One clashes with the other. Theory always aims at elevating that which is here and now to the level of an absolute being, observable only through the mind’s eye. Positivism, which disqualifies metaphysics, is, according to its critics, an extension of the ideal of scientific cognition, specified in metaphysical tradition as theoria. It is from there, starting with Plato, that traditional political theory (like the theory of each kind of studies) derives its model: polis is the reflection of the universe – in either, the issue is harmony and order. The fundamental issue of political theory is therefore the problem of social order. Thus traditionally, as Adriana Cavarero observes, political theory consists in theorizing politics, which essentially denotes ‘depoliticizing’ of politics, i.e. reduction of politics to the principles of theoria. The present-day political practice (the crisis of politics caused mainly by the conceptual crisis associated with the disappearance of the category of national state in the age of globalization) demands that such a theory be revised, that it return to
political practice. In other words, as the Italian author suggests, it demands that theory be ‘ politicized’ (17).

A chance of this revision is seen today in practical reason. Just as scientific reason is sometimes criticized and charged with detaching theory from politics, with non-political authorization of theory supporting a fundamentalist political culture, practical reason is treated as a tool for making normative propositions that avoid the fundamentalist separation from politics. It is practical reason that, according to some scholars, is to enable creation of ‘applied political theory’ (18). The fundamental difficulty of such a theory lies in that it is expected to be based on the conception of reason, which is the source of such norms of activity of individual and collective (state-social) entities that motivate those entities in the manner free from coercion and from the imposition of content-specified orientations binding on all. It appears that such criteria, under the present socio-cultural conditions, which I am going to discuss in Part Three, are best fulfilled by transversal reason (19): it is responsible for transcending the separatist image of rationalities governing the human world. It is therefore primarily interested not in content, not in essences – i.e. concepts, theories, intellectual representations – of politics, economy, morality, or religion but in coincidences/intersections and transitions between them. Transversal reason is an instrument functionally strong and efficient enough to help us move every day between politics, economy, morality ... without mixing the orders of things (learnedly called rationalities, discourses or paradigms) on a local (community, group, or national) scale and supralocal: international, transnational, and global. Political science as an extension of transversal reason is thus practiced nowadays in an interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary manner, its subdisciplines therefore intersect and overlap, and assume one’s ability to move not only from one to another but also at their intersections and between them. For that reason, in research practice, it is impossible to treat in entire isolation from one another for example political theory and political doctrines or history of political thought; international relations and international economy, political sociology and (that which is now called) cultural studies; communication theory and cultural semiotics.

I am presenting theoretico-scientific reflection, which thus sustains cooperation in the area of political science. The issue, in most general terms, is cooperation between the aforesaid technical knowledge and practical knowledge or, to put it differently, between social studies, scientistically oriented, and humanistic studies. The common formal object of either are relations – all kinds of relations.

Social studies, namely, discover cause-and-effect relationships formulated as general laws. For example, the political-science model of decision-making analysis looks then as follows: knowing the content of a decision and implementation actions taken on its basis, ‘in accordance with the direction of fallible reductive thinking’, we seek reasons (causes) for the decision and, on the one hand, laws governing internal political processes, as well as, on the other hand, laws governing international processes (20). It should also be remembered that because of the ambiguity and conventionality of the terms ‘cause’ and ‘effect’, the methodology of social science today employs other categories, such as the concepts of sufficient condition and necessary condition – the view, according to which scientific laws describe the sufficient or necessary conditions for the occurrence of given phenomena, is called conditionalism (21).

The purpose of humanistic studies is, however, to establish the meaning and significance of phenomena by means of interpretive and historical methods. Meaning also has a relational nature: something it means to somebody. Likewise with significance: the significance of something can be established in relation to what and why this something means to us. The answers to such questions change depending on who, where, and when asks them; they are thus never final and universally significant (22). Oakeshott drew attention to the special presence (to the ‘highest extent’) in political science of knowledge acquired in practice, some times called ‘art’: as such it eludes general laws. There are serious consequences of this practical character of political science. This can be seen both on its language and explanation levels. The language of political science is close to the language of political action, just as the language of ethics is close to morality. For when we talk about politics we mean the domain of intentional, conscious, reflective human behaviors. Without
taking this fact into consideration, i.e. without making an effort to understand the self-understanding of political actors, all scholarly reflection on them would be inadequate. Which is why political scientists of different orientation agree that political theory at bottom ‘is an extension of a natural, daily activity’ (23); that it is a „methodological extension and critical clarification of the already reflective and problematized character of historically situated practices of practical reasoning” (24). Even ‘postmetaphysical’ discursive theory assumes (entirely metaphysically!) that its fundamental communication rationality is ‘set in the linguistic telos of agreement’, which guides anyone who uses natural language (25).

This relationship between facticity and validity (that which is binding or normative) means that the world of politics is always understandable and predictable to some extent; that general concepts used in the field of political science demonstrate in the empirical material – in the investigated decisions, actions, or phenomena, determined by context and circumstances – some regularities and causal mechanisms. For that reason we cannot obviously speak about cause and effect under these conditions in the absolute or ideal sense like in natural history. Social science seeks causal laws, understanding them only as a methodological rule rather than an absolutely binding paradigm. Politicians follow diverse interests and motivations, owing to which, especially in democracy, they take different stances in given cases. Therefore, in order to understand them, to feel their attitudes and motivations, it is not enough to have general knowledge only. To understand the whole of political life, political choices, reasons for making them and probable consequences, requires therefore a synthesis of scientistic approaches (once subsumed under nomothetic sciences) and humanistic (idiographic) ones, i.e. a synthesis of both causal and interpretive explanations, connected with reflections on their meaning and significance. The dividing line between the two kinds of investigations is, as Ruth W. Grant says, permeable. And the writer goes on to explain:

*The significance of something may well include its causal impact. Political theory as an enterprise assumes that interpretations, conceptual regimes, judgments of significance, and ideas of all kinds are themselves both causes and effects. (...) In other words, the study of politics needs both to seek general laws to explain the causes of political behavior and to develop interpretations of the meaning and significance of political events and conceptual regimes to form evaluative judgments of them. Political studies have both scientific and humanistic aims (26).*

Acceptance of the methodological significance of the aforementioned cooperation in both types of studies in the field of political science allows the political scientist to consciously, competently (and it would be good if without fear of institutional sanctions) utilize various methods and techniques appropriate to the object and goal of investigations. As far as the object is concerned, it is becoming increasingly synergetic today, it requires diverse approaches entering together the area of political science. For example, try to ponder the phenomenon of state and authority under the conditions of so-called information society. To understand it requires studies in sociology, science of public organization, theory of organization and management, and media theory.

**FOOTNOTES**

1) These are: 1) international relations, 2) political theory, 3) history of political thought, 4) political doctrines, 5) contemporary political history, 6) political sociology, 7) social politics, 8) economic politics, 9) political geography, 10) political philosophy, 11) political psychology, 12) theory of state, 13) theory of communication, 14) political systems, 15) international economy, 16) press systems.

2) This has been its full name since 2003. Observe, incidentally, that Mojsiewicz himself belongs to the elite circle of its members divided, by the discipline key, into permanent sections elected democratically by all senior (independent) academics, employed at the appropriate faculties of all higher education institutions in Poland. The institutional classification of sciences into fields and disciplines within their scope comes from the Central Commission. Thus, for example,
according to the Commission’s classification, humanities is a field, while political science is a discipline.


6) Cz. Mojsiewicz, *Problemy programowe i kadrowe politologii w wyŜszych szkołach niepublicznych* (Problems with the curricula and teaching staff in non-public higher education institutions) [in:] idem, *Od polityki do politologii* (From politics to political science), p. 260. One more conclusion by this author: “The future of political science in Poland are the academic teachers educated at the faculties (institutes) of political science and bound to their workplace by doctoral and postdoctoral degrees in political science. This is the goal we have to reach in order to build the scientific level of the political science discipline and avoid dispersing political science among other disciplines in social sciences and humanities. We must follow the example of other scientific disciplines on the requirements who can be a lawyer, historian, philosopher, economist, etc.” (ibidem, pp. 260/261).


14) Although we have the Polish Political Science Society in this country, its stature and scholarly impact are far smaller than that of its American counterpart.


Примітка редакції. Тут публікуємо вступ та дві перші частини цієї статті, третя частина буде надрукована у наступному номері часопису «Філософія спілкування». 